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RECENT DECISIONS

educate himself to better recognize the battered-child syndrome, the legal profession
and society as a whole must seek the passage of laws similar to those enacted in New
York and California. These laws must not

indicate a hasty repudiation of the senseless
brutality of sad and frightful people, but
rather a passionate interest and a determined attempt to shield both children and
adults alike.

Recent Decision:
Expatriation of Naturalized
Citizen Held Discriminatory
And Unconstitutional
Angelika Schneider, a German national
by birth, emigrated to the United States
where she acquired American citizenship.
In 1956 she married a German national and
has since resided in Germany. In 1959 she
was refused a passport by the State Department on the ground that, by her residence
for three years in the country of her birth,
she had forfeited her citizenship under Section 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952.1 Mrs. Schneider
sued in a federal district court for a judgment declaring her an American citizen,
but was denied relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that section
352(a) (1), in its unjustifiable discrimination between naturalized and native-born
citizens, is violative of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Schneider v.
Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).
In 1868 Congress declared voluntary expatriation to be the "natural and inherent

right" of all citizens.2 At the same time, the
United States extended equal diplomatic
protection to all naturalized Americans residing abroad.3 From that time until the
present, the naturalized citizen has been the
object of numerous governmental restrictions which have, to a greater or lesser degree, threatened his citizenship.
Prior to 1907 it was the duty of the
State Department to determine when, in
fact, an American citizen had chosen to
4
sever his allegiance to the United States.
The confusion spawned by conflicting departmental regulations often placed the fate

1The Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat.
269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1958), provides in
§ 352(a) that "a person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality
by-(l) having a continuous residence for three
years in the territory of a foreign state of which he
was formerly a national or in which the place of
his birth is situated .. "

2 REV.

STAT. §

1999 (1875). While this statute,

which repudiated the common-law doctrine of
perpetual allegiance, was originally intended to
protect the interest of arriving immigrants, it
was clear that an American citizen, native-born
or naturalized, might choose to exercise the
"right" and reject his United States citizenship.
3 "All naturalized citizens of the United States
while in foreign countries are entitled to and shall
receive from this Government the same protection
of persons and property which is accorded to
native-born citizens." REV. STAT. § 2000 (1875),
22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958).
4 Under reciprocal agreements with several countries, when a naturalized American citizen returned to his native land for an extended period
of time, a presumption arose that he intended to
reassume that prior nationality. See, e.g., Naturalization Convention With Costa Rica, June 10,
1911, 37 Stat. 1603 (1912); Convention With
Great Britain, May 13, 1870, 16 Stat. 775 (1870).
This presumption was rebuttable. 3 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1942). See
generally Comment, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 120

(1949).
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of the naturalized citizen in jeopardy. At
one time an extended residence in the land
of his birth might, in itself, be construed as
a voluntary renunciation of allegiance; 5 at
other times it might not. 6
To remedy this situation, Congress, in
1907, codified the diverse regulations concerning expatriation into a single act 7 which
created a rebuttable presumption that a
naturalized citizen 8 had voluntarily relinquished his United States citizenship when
he returned to the country of his origin for
two years. 9
The Nationality Act of 19401 removed
5 3 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

737 (1906).
6 Id. at 928-29.
7 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).

One writer contends that the State Department
recommended the passage of an act declaring any
American citizen presumptively expatriated after
five years foreign residence; he asserts that Congress, disregarding this recommendation, limited
the presumption of expatriation to naturalized
citizens alone and gave "no reason ... for this
unwarranted discrimination." Comment, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 52, 64 (1963). Justification for the
provisions of the act affecting naturalized citizens
only has been found, however, in the theory that,
being more likely to remain abroad and intermingle with native populations, the naturalized
citizen will be the source of constant embarrassment to the government in its conduct of foreign
affairs. Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302, 310
(D.D.C. 1963), rev'd, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).
s

9 In actual practice, it would appear that the naturalized citizen residing abroad longer than the
prescribed statutory period lost only the diplomatic protection of the United States. 28 Ops.
Att'y Gen. 507, 508 (1910). Moreover, the rebuttable presumption of voluntary expatriation
might be overcome by reaffirming allegiance
(Camardo v. Tillinghast, 29 F.2d 527, 532 (1st
Cir. 1928)), or by attempting to return to this

country (Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388, 393 (8th
Cir. 1923)). It is interesting to note that no such
statutory presumption has ever arisen from the
prolonged foreign residence of any native-born
American.
10 54 Stat. 1170 (1940).
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this rebuttable presumption and created in
its stead a conclusive presumption of permanent expatriation upon completion of
three years residence in the country of
origin.11 This latter provision was incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 which was challenged in the
instant case.
Theoretically, the present act merely prescribes the manner in which a citizen may
expatriate himself. In practice, however, it
demonstrates a profound transition which
has vitiated the concept of "voluntary" expatriation as expounded in 1868. Until the
passage of the Act of 1907, expatriation
could only be effected by the willful renunciation of allegiance by the citizen. From that
time, however, Congress has stipulated that
certain acts, when freely performed, will
result in expatriation. In Savorgnan v.
United States,12 it was held that citizenship
would be forfeited whenever the act designated by statute was "voluntarily" performed, even though the citizen had no
subjective intent to sever his allegiance. In
effect, then, Congress no longer creates a
procedure for the exercise of a right but
rather proscribes certain "voluntary" conduct. 13
The very existence of this congressional
power to designate acts which, when freely
performed, will effect expatriation has been
11 The act of 1907 did not prove satisfactory in
practice. 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 399, 404 (1928).
Moreover, the judicial process in expatriation
cases was long and expensive. The rebuttable
presumption, therefore, was replaced by an automatic loss of citizenship in the interest of administrative convenience. Schneider v. Rusk, supra
note 8, at 309.
12 338 U.S. 491 (1950)
(plaintiff had become a
foreign national). But see Perkins v. Elg, 307
U.S. 325, 334 (1939).
13 See generally Note, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 932
(1954); 9 CATHOLic LAW. 330 (1963).
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vigorously contested in the United States
Supreme Court. Although Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to
create uniform laws of naturalization, the
Court has been reluctant to admit of any
converse congressional power to denaturalize. 14 However, the Court has affirmed congressional action in the area of expatriation
when necessary and proper to the furtherance of a constitutionally enumerated
power. Thus, in Perez v. Brownell,1 5 it was
held that where a rational nexus existed
between expatriation and the successful
conduct of foreign affairs, Congress was
empowered to denaturalize."0 A strong minority of the Court refused to recognize any
congressional power to expatriate. They
reasoned that expatriation could be effected
only when the sovereign citizen chose to
renounce his allegiance. 7
The recent judicial approval in Perez of
the power of Congress to create norms for
constructive expatriation has had the effect
of reducing the issue in similar cases to a
question of due process: "Is the means,
withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the

"The simple power of the national legislature is,
to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and
the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as
respects the individual." Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827
(1824) (dictum); accord, United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).
15 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (plaintiff had voted in a
foreign election).

power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance
of embarrassment in the conduct of our
foreign relations ... ?, 1
In Lapides v. Clark,1" with a factual pattern similar to the present case, a federal
district court, finding the necessary reasonable nexus between denaturalization and the
proper conduct of foreign affairs, affirmed a
congressional distinction between natural20
ized and native-born citizens.
To justify the power of Congress to distinguish citizens according to the origin of
their citizenship, without violating due process, the court in Lapides relied heavily on
the reasoning in Mackenzie v. Hare.2' In that
case it was held that an American woman
lost her citizenship by "voluntarily" performing an act (marrying a foreigner) designated by the statute as a ground for expatriation. Since the statute, upheld in Mackenzie, was discriminatory since it did not
expatriate American men who married nonnationals, the decision was construed in
Lapides as a precedent for valid congressional discrimination in the area of expatriation.
It would appear, however, that the Mackenzie case was not a valid precedent for

14

Is Perez v. Brownell, supra note 17, at 60, as

quoted in Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187,
1189 (1964).
19 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.

860 (1949).

16 See generally Maxey, Loss Of Nationality: Individual Choice Or Government Fiat?, 26 ALBANY
L. REV. 151 (1962).
17Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958)
(dissenting opinion). See generally Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1510 (1960); Hurst, Can Congress Take
Away Citizenship?, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 62

20 The dissent in the instant case utilized similar
reasoning. Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 18, at
1190. The distinction which was justified in
Lapides was substantial. As in the instant case the
statute operated to allow the native-born citizen
to reside abroad indefinitely with impunity, while
the naturalized citizen might do so only at the
risk of losing his citizenship forever. In effect,
the statute expatriated the naturalized citizen for
voluntarily performing an act innocent in itself
and without sanction when performed by others.

(1956).

21239 U.S. 299 (1915).
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the holding in Lapides. One distinguishing
feature was that Mrs. Mackenzie's citizenship was not taken from her permanently
- it merely abated during the term of her
marriage. Moreover, at the time of this
decision many countries accepted the common-law doctrine that the citizenship of a
wife merged with that of her husband.
Viewed in this light, Mackenzie is not a
precedent for legislative discrimination be22
tween native-born and naturalized citizens.
Judge Edgerton, dissenting in Lapides,
argued that naturalized citizens are in all
respects equal to native-born citizens, and
under no circumstances can Congress dis22 The fourteenth amendment declares that all
persons born or naturalized in the United States
are citizens thereof, and the courts have traditionally upheld the theory of a single and equal
citizenship. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605, 624 (1931); Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, supra note 14, at 827 (dictum). But see
Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 18, at 1190 (dissenting opinion). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has, in certain limited instances, affirmed
congressional legislation which, in fact, classified
citizens either by economic activity or by race,
e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
217-18 (1944) (exclusion of Japanese-Americans
from a designated area); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (curfew on
Japanese residents only); Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (tax applied
only to those employing eight or more persons).
It is important to note that congressional classifications based on race have only been allowed
in times of great national peril.
In Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658
(1946), the Court indicated that, besides ineligibility for the presidency, there are other "exceptions of limited character" to the theory of single
citizenship - listed among these exceptions was
§ 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940 (the predecessor of the present statute). Since constitutionality was not involved in the Knauer case,
the mere mention of § 404 as an existing example
of distinction between citizens should not be construed as judicial approval or toleration of the
underlying theory.

tinguish between them. 23 Support for this
view is easily found. The Supreme Court
itself has stated that the naturalized citizen,
once he obtains valid naturalization, "stands
on an equal footing with the native citizen in
all respects, save that of eligibility to the
Presidency."

24

It was in accord with this sentiment that
the majority in the instant case declared
section 352(a)(1) unconstitutional. Mr.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
began with the premise "that the rights of
citizenship of the native born and of the
naturalized person are of the same dignity
and are coextensive. ' 25 The majority found
that section 352(a)(1) "proceeds on the
impermissible assumption that naturalized
citizens as a class are less reliable and bear
less allegiance to this country than do the
native born"

26

and, as a result, is unjustifi-

ably discriminatory in violation of due process.

27

Citizenship is so basic to the well-being
of any person that it has been described as
the right to have rights. Without this basic
"right," a man is reduced to the inherently
-3Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
24 Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
25 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 18.
25Id. at 1190. There is no indication that the
United States is subjected to any certain or substantial embarrassment because of the foreign
residence of American naturalized citizens. For a
discussion of the problems created by naturalized
citizens residing abroad, see Boudin, supra note
17, at 1524-28, and Maxey, supra note 16, at 182.
"The difference in degree of embarrassment, if
any, is not shown to be substantial enough to
warrant so great a difference in the consequence
meted out only to the naturalized citizen."
Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 8, at 322 (dissenting opinion).
27 Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 18, at 1190. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
(prohibiting unjustifiable racial discrimination as
violative of due process).
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disabling condition of statelessness 28-he becomes an alien with only limited rights and
privileges.2 9 The decision strikes down a
statute which has operated to deprive many
Americans of their citizenship because of
the mere fact that, as naturalized citizens,
they had resided abroad. The Court has
thus determined that a classification so
based is creative of a second-class citizenship. 30 The Schneider case will also strike
down at least twenty existing naturalization
treaties, 31 and will affect the lives of some
50,000 ex-citizens who have been expatri2
ated by extended foreign residence.
It appears, moreover, that this decision
may well provide the impetus for a re-examination of the naturalization and expatriation laws of the United States. One author
predicts that unless the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 is repealed, at least
six sections will now be viewed by the courts
as discriminatory in violation of due process. 33
It would appear that two alternatives remain open to Congress in this area. On the
one hand, Congress may retain a conclusive
presumption of expatriation equally appli28 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 17, at 64; accord,

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
29 See generally Preuss, International Law and
Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. LJ. 250

(1934).
3o Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 18, at 1190.
31 1d. at 1192 (dissenting opinion).

, Time, May 29, 1964, p. 57.
33 Amundson, No More Second-Class Citizenship,
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Recent Decision:
Appearance by Both Parties
Held Insufficient to Validate
Mexican Divorce Decree

cable to all citizens in any statute replacing
section 352(a)(1). If this is done, the
Court, while recognizing the congressional
3 4
power to expatriate in certain instances
will continue to investigate each case individually in an attempt to ascertain violations
33
of due process.
On the other hand, Congress might replace the present nationality law with a
statute creating a rebuttable presumption
similar to that contained in the Expatriation Act of 1907.36 In view of the inherent
value of citizenship, this alternative would
seem preferable. Such a law might apply
only a rebuttable presumption of voluntary
expatriation for all citizens who perform the
act designated by statute. Thus, individual
rights would not be limited for mere convenience of administration and no man
would lose his basic right of citizenship
without first being granted an opportunity
to exhibit a real attachment to the United
States.
34 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

144, 214 (1963).
,9 Compare Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187
(1964), with Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1957). In Perez, the act of expatriation was freely
voting in a foreign political election. The Court
apparently feels that activity of this type by those
claiming American citizenship is clearly more
conducive to international friction and embarrassment than is the neutral act of simple residence
abroad. Therefore, Congress was empowered to
expatriate in Perez without violation of due process; in Schneider it was not.
36 See Roche, The Loss of American Nationality
-The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99
U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1950).

Plaintiff husband commenced an action
for annulment on the ground that a Mexican divorce procured by his wife and her
former husband was a nullity. Having pre-

